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In the previous three chapters an examination was made of the impact of
Chilean international economic regimes on her balance of payments. In the
remainder of Part III, the effects in other major areas of concern of macro-
economic policy are explored. This chapter is focused on short-run stability.
Short-run fluctuations are of considerable importance because they frequently s
have undermined Chilean attempts to liberalize, to transform the structure of
the economy, to redistribute economic power, and to develop more rapidly.
Price stability is taken up in section 9.1, and variations in real output and in t
the utilization of primary factors are explored in section 9.2.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i. Prima facie, inflation rates seem to have been inversely related to the
degree of liberalization. Such an association does not reflect causality. Instead
it reflects the fact that the liberalization efforts were part of the briefly succesful
stabilization programs.
ii. At times, inflation may have been imported from abroad owing to price S
increasesin world markets. On the average, however, Chilean price increases
have far outpaced those in the relevant world markets.
iii. The impact of devaluation and liberalization on prices is quite com-
plex because of many simultaneous indirect effects, especially through the
nexus of monetary system, prices, wages and anticipated inflation. Devaluation
alone leads to fairly considerable short-run price increases: the impact elas-
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ticity of price with respect to the NER is 0.6. This result in isolation validates a
widespread Chilean fear of the inflationary effect of devaluation.
Reductions in quantitative restrictions, however, work in the opposite
direction. This last fact has often been ignored in discussions of the inflationary
impact of liberalization and devaluation. Such a policy package, therefore,
would be less inflationary than is often hypothesized.
iv. Prima facie, short-run fluctuations in capacity utilization do not seem
to have been related to the degree of liberalization. This lack of association is
not surprising given the importance of domestic factors in determining output
and given that many of the important foreign-sector factors have been beyond
Chilean control and thus not affected by her international economic regime.
However, Chilean policies have exacerbated the sensitivity of her capacity
utilization to international market fluctuations beyond her control by discour-
aging risk reduction through diversification of exports and by increasing the
probability of balance-of-payments crises with their attendant shortages of im-
ported inputs through negative inducements for exports and positive ones for
imports.
v. The short-run impact of devaluation and liberalization on output is
negative. Reduced quantitative restrictions lower output immediately through
increased competition more than they increase it by higher imports of inter-
mediate inputs. These results reinforce the frequent Chilean pessimism about
the short-run real impact of liberalization and devaluation. They contrast
sharply, moreover, with the Taylor and Black [19731 estimate of an employ-
ment elasticity with respect to devaluation of 0.9. The Taylor and Black result
appears to be misleading because of the assumed exogenism of nominal wages,
the money supply, and anticipated inflation.
vi. The instruments at the Chilean government's disposal for improving
the trade-off between unused capacity and inflation are limited indeed. Mone-
tary policy has exogenous elements, but the monetary base and the monetary
multiplier both respond substantially to foreign-sector changes. The develop-
ment of more effective monetary tools would increase the possibility of avoiding
some of the negative short-run effects of devaluation. However, the trade-off
would remain unless there was a fairly substantial drop in inflationary expecta- P
tions. Because of the long history of inflation in Chile, inducing such a change
in anticipations is quite difficult.
9.1 NOMINAL STABILITY
In previous chapters it was repeatedly emphasized that Chile has a long history
of considerable inflation. Since World War II, for example, the rate of increase
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In this section three questions are taken up concerning the impact of the ti
foreign sector on domestic price changes: 1(i)Has there been a relation be-
tween the rate of inflation and the degree of liberalization? (ii) To what extent
have international price increases contributed to the Chilean inflation? (iii) a
What have been the implications of liberalization for Chilean prices? a
S
9.1.1Relation of Inflation to Exchange Control Phases.
In every more liberal phase since the Great Depression, the mean rate of
inflation fell (line 2.1 in Table A. 1). In every more restrictive one, it in-
creased.2 With no further information one might be tempted to posit some i
inverse causal relation between liberalization and inflation. The real explana-
tion, however, is that the three major liberalization attempts were each part of a
a stabilization program which met with some initial success.3 Instead of reduc-
ing inflation, in fact, liberalization itself ceteris paribus probably intensified in- r
flationary pressures (see subsection 9.1.3, below). b
SI
9.1.2Contribution of International Price Increases to Chilean Inflation. n
Examination of the annual rates of change of foreign trade unit values 1
reveals that in many instances, external price changes undoubtedly fed the
C
Chilean inflation. The percentage increase in the unit value of imports (mea- I
sured in U.S. dollars) averaged 15.2 in 1940—46, 23.6 in 1947, and 16.8 in h
1951. The percentage increase in the unit value of exports (measured in U.S.
( dollars) was 16.2 in 1946, 31.4 in 1947, 26.5 in 1951, 15.4 in 1952, 14.4 in
1956, and 11.4 in 1959. For both imports and exports, moreover, increases in
external prices were relatively high in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
On the average, however, internal price rises far outpaced external ones.
For the 1945—65 period, for which consistent data are available, for example,
the mean percentage increase in the unit value of imports was only 2.1 and
that for exports was 5.1. The mean percentage rate of growth in the GDP de-
flator, in contrast, was 29.6. Although international price movements at times




9.1.3Price Impact of Liberalizations.
Much of the Chilean reluctance to liberalize and reduce the extent of over- U
valuation is rooted in fears of the inflationary consequences of such actions. e
S
9.1.3.1PARTIAL-EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS.
In a long-run, perfectly competitive equilibrium with no quantitative re- f
strictions and no water in the tariff, the domestic producer price of interna- SSHORT-RUN STABILITY IN NOMINAL AND REAL TERMS 221
tionally traded commodities would equal the c.i.f. price of the same corn-
modities adjusted for price-related factors in the international economic regime.
In such a situation the exchange rate and the prices of nontraded commodities
•
also would have adjusted so that equilibrium existed in international payments
and so that the domestic demand for real monetary balances equaled the
supply.
• Actual Chilean prices, of course, are not at long-run, perfectly competi-
tive equilibrium levels. Instead, they are constantly adjusting in response to
substantial shocks, especially in monetary policy and in the international eco-
1- nomic regime including varying degrees of use of quantitative restrictions.
te Thus, to estimate price determinants, sector-specific characteristics of the im-
pact of relevant domestic and international variables and the sector-specific
• adjustment to those characteristics must be included.
The general specification adopted here is a somewhat eclectic quasi-
reduced form with the rate of change of sectoral product prices dependent on
both domestic- and foreign-sector factors, some general and some sector-
specific. A quasi-reduced form is necessary because the lack of sectoral de-
mand and inventory data precludes direct estimation of structural relations.
The rate of change rather than the level of prices is used because the high
e Chilean inflation rates in the sample period cause so much multicollinearity if
levels are utilized that itis not possible to distinguish among competing
hypotheses.4
Table 9.1 contains estimates of the determinants of the rate of change of
Chilean sectoral prices for 1945—65. From an over-all viewpoint these esti-
mates appear quite satisfactory. The corrected coefficients of determination
indicate that the specification is consistent with from 0.90 to 0.98 of the vari-
ance in the dependent variable over the sample period. No serious problems of
serial correlation are obvious. The estimated coefficients generally have the
• anticipated signs.
Much of the explanatory power lies in the domestic-sector variables. Gen-
eral domestic factors include a dummy variable for the initiation of stabiliza-
tion programs and rates of change in the monetary supply, real GDP, an
NBER-type index of current activity, the total inventory level relative to total
GDP, and the distribution of factoral income and sectoral product. Sector-
specific domestic factors include the rates of change in total real sectoral de-
mand (including exports) relative to real sectoral output, sectoral capacity
utilization, intermediate-input prices (by means of which the influence of mon-
etary changes may be transmitted partially or totally in some sectors)real
sectoral unit labor costs (including employers' social security tax contributions),
and real sectoral average labor productivity. An extensive discussion of these
factors is given in Behrman [1974].° However, it should be emphasized that a







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.224 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
Notes to Table 9.1 th R' =coefficientof multiple determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. ra SE =standarderror of estimate.
DW =Durbin-Watsonstatistic.
a. The figuresinparentheses are the absolute values of the I statistics,each of which
is significantlynonzeroatthe 5 per cent level unless otherwise noted. Since the variables
are in the form of rates of change, the point estimates are elasticities. In those cases in
which the lagged dependent variable is included, the Durbiri-Watson statistic isbiased —
toward2.0. For data sources, see Behrman [1974].
b. The Hall-Sutch [19691 polynomial method (without a tail) is used over a six-year
period. The implied lag patterns are as follows: re
Lag (no. of years)
Sector 0 1 2 3 4 5
Construction .770 .290 .088 .056 .098 .113
Industry .819—.034—.270—.136 .119 .247
Utilities .642 .171—.052—.103—.060—.000
Housing .279 .232 .186 .139 .093 .046
Services .203 .105 .033—.014—.035—.030
c. The Hall-Sutch [19691 polynomial method (without a tail) isused over a six-year
period.Theimplied lag patterns are as follows:
Lag(no.of years)




d. The NBER-type indicator of currenteconomic activity is unlagged, as are the
variables used in alternative 1.The variable for agriculture and mining is the ratio of
totalreal sectoral demand to total real sectoral output;for construction, sectoral capacity
utilization. The alternative-2 variables are taken with a one-year lag. For agriculture, the
variable is the ratio of total current inventorytototal GDP; for construction, sectoral
capacity utilization; and for transportation, the ratio of total inventory to total GDP.
e. Includes employers' share of social securitytax.
f.For construction and services, the dependent variable is lagged. The underlying
variable for industry is a stabilization dummy with a value of 1.0 in 1956, 1957, 1960,
1961,and 1965, and0.0 otherwise. Forhousing, the variable is the share of GDP orig-
inatingin agriculture.
g.The Hall-Sutch [1969] polynomial method (without a tail)isusedover a six-year
period. The implied lag patternfor thesector is as follows: no lag, 0.0763; one year,
0.0364;twoyears, 0.0073; three years, —0.0104; four years, —0.0181; five years, —0.0145.
Ii.For agriculture, the underlying variable is the ratio of the domestic price index
for agricultural productsto the U.S. wholesale price index, the whole as a ratio to the
nationalaccountsEER. For constructionandfor housing, the variable is lagged one year.
i. For utilities,the underlying variable is the ratio of the black-market NER to the
national accounts NER; for housing, it is the ratio of the domestic GDP deflator to the
U.S. GDP deflator adjusted for theaverage import-tax rate and the average prior.deposit
j.Formining, the underlying variable is the unit value of mining exports multiplied
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thatthe prior-deposit variable used is the change in the cost of prior deposits, not the
rate of change in the cost.
k. The underlying variable is the ratio of the money supply to real GDP.
I. Significantly nonzero at the 15 per cent level.
•Ich m. Significantly nonzero at the 10 per cent level.
• n. This variable is lagged one year for this sector.
in
mitted through some of these variables, especially through the money supply,
ear real product, intermediate-input prices, and sectoral demands.
Some element of the international economic regime apparently is a sig-
nificantly nonzero direct determinant of the rate of change of prices in every
sector:
Price-related factors have a significantly nonzero impact in five of the
eight sectors. These factors include expectational effects of exchange-rate
changes,7 cost-push factors related to imported intermediate inputs,8 and inter-
national prices.9 The estimates imply the highest relative responses to devalua-
F tionin the export-oriented mining sector and in the relatively import-dependent
• transportation sector.
Quantitativerestrictions have significantly nonzero effects on price
changes in five of the eight sectors.1° The largest positive response is in trans-
portation, which seems consistent with the relatively large impact of quanti-
tative restrictions on transportation imports that is discussed in subsection 6.2.1
above. However, negative responses are suggested for three sectors having non-
tradable output: construction, housing, and services. This might be rationalized
as reflecting an inverse relationship between quantitative restrictions and the
the availability of inputs and credit to these sectors, but such an explanation seems
of somewhat forced.
For industry, transportation, and services, finally, evidence exists of one
further significantly nonzero direct link between the international economic
4 policyregime and price changes. In these three sectors especially, when prior
import deposit requirements are increased, part of the banking system credit is
absorbed and inflationary pressure is reduced.
tig- The partial-equilibrium estimates, then, suggest that the most important
direct determinants of sectoral price changes are domestic ones, especially the p
money supply. The impact of the foreign sector, nevertheless, is significant for
•s. anumber of sectors, even if the questionable inverse responses in the nontrad-
able sectors are ignored.1' Devaluation would be accompanied by increased




Domestic factors are more important than foreign ones in the partial-
te equilibrium analysis of price determination. Within a general-equilibrium con-P
I
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text, however, international factors may be much more important than in the
partial analysis if they have an impact through some of the domestic variables. t
The nature of the general-equilibrium impact, of course, depends upon what
kind of macro model is appropriate for the analysis.
In a classical world with price flexibility and an exogenous money supply
and no quantitative restrictions, devaluation leads to changes in relative prices
but not in the over-all price level. Such assumptions have little relation, how-
ever, to recent Chilean experience. Product and factor prices have not been
flexible because of conditions resembling "unlimited supply of labor" in the
traditional sector, strong unionization and administered prices in parts of the
modern sector, and government minimum-wage and price-ceiling legislation.
Quantitative restrictions have been used extensively (see Part II, above).12
Determination of the money supply has not been entirely exogenous. Therefore
the economy has not been at full employment as in a classical model. Instead,
during the two post-World War II decades, forgone output due to underutiliza-
tion of capacity equaled almost a year and a half of actual output! 13
A Keynesian-like model is much more appropriate for short-run analysis
of the Chilean economy because of the presence of price rigidities and under-
utilized capacity.14 A simple Keynesian model is given in Appendix C which
can be used to explore the price impact of devaluation and of changing quanti-
tative restrictions.
A Keynesian National Income Determination Model.Consider the situ-
ation in which anticipated inflation, nominal wages, and the money supply are
all assumed to be exogenous. Relationship C.15' in Appendix C gives the total
differential of prices under these assumptions. Devaluation and increased quan-
titative restrictions both probably increase the price level. Both work to in-
crease aggregate demand. Both will have greater price impact the larger the
absolute value of the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable in-
come, the interest rate response of the demand for real monetary balances, the
second derivative of production with respect to labor, and the sensitivity of the
marginal product of capital to changes in the size of the employed labor
force.15 Both will have greater price impact the smaller the absolute value of
the marginal tax rate, the marginal propensity to import out of income, the con-
sumption response to real interest rates, the sensitivity of desired real monetary
balance to income, the marginal product of labor, the sensitivity of investment
to discrepancies between the marginal product of capital and the cost of capital,
and the responsiveness of import demand to the domestic price level. Devalua-
tion will increase prices more the larger the responses of exports and imports
to the exchange rate and of taxes to imports and the smaller the sensitivity of
taxes to exports. Increases in quantitative restrictions will increase prices
more the larger the marginal propensity to consume, the sensitivity of taxes
to imports, and the response of imports to quantitative restrictions.
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e For reasonable values of the parameters in relationships C.15', the infla-
tionary impact of devaluation or of increased quantitative restrictions may be
• quite substantial. But that is not the whole story. The effect of three variables—
• anticipated inflation, nominal wages, and the money supply—which were as-
sumed to be exogenous to obtain C.15', apparently has been to increase the in-
flationary impact of devaluations.'6 Anticipated inflation has been related to ex-
change-rate policy in at least two ways:
• i.Several Chilean governments—most notably under Alessandri in the
be stabilization attempt of 1959—61 and under Allende in 1970—71-—explicitly
be used a fixed NER as a symbol of their quest for price stability. When devalua-
tion finally was forced because of foreign-exchange crises, inflationary expecta-
tions soared. At other times, the NER has not been an official symbol of price
stability, but it has been a widely known unofficial indicator of probable price
movements.
ii. Under the more restrictive trade regimes the government often has
favored the importation of items with large weights in the domestic price in-
is dices. The hope has been that such expanded supplies would lessen price
ir- increases for these items, lower measured inflation, and thus reduce inflationary
ph expectations. To the extent that liberalization has resulted in more unified ex-
change rates, of course, this phenomenon has been reversed.17
Nominal wages have not been exogenous, but have responded to price
expectations which, in part, directly and indirectly reflected exchange-rate
movements.18
The money supply has reflected foreign-sector policies in a number of
respects:
ci- i. The monetary base has varied substantially in its dependence on foreign
exchange and gold. Before the Great Depression and in its early stages this
direct dependence was almost complete. This led to very deflationary monetary
policies at the start of the 1930s. Owing to the fall in the Central Bank's re-
serves of more than 58 per cent between the end of 1929 and mid-1931 and to
a misguided stubbornness in maintaining the gold standard, for example, the
money supply declined by 38 per cent, the real rate of interest was allowed to
increase by 50 per cent (in hopes of lessening gold outflows), and the whole-
sale price index dropped by 16 per cent. In mid-1931, after an abrupt change
•t in the foreign trade regime and the resignation of President Ibañez, a cheap-
money policy was adopted.
- Insubsequent years, according to estimates by Luders [1970: 15], there
s was much less direct dependence of total monetary emissions on Central Bank
•f foreign exchange and gold operations. They were less than a fifth of the total
• monetary base in the 193 1—39 subphase, somewhat over a third in 1940—46,
s and often less than that in the post-World War II phases and subphases.
Nevertheless, changes in foreign-exchange reserves due to variations in the
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balance-of-payments surplus have had substantial effects on the monetary
base. The Central Bank usually has not been able to neutralize more than a
limited part of these changes because of the limited effectiveness of its policy
instruments. As a result, both devaluation and increased quantitative restric-
tions have caused additional indirect inflationary pressure through their impact
on foreign-exchange reserves and on the monetary base (see the discussion
of C.1O' in Appendix C).
ii. The monetary base has also depended indirectly on the foreign sector
through the impact of the international economic policy regime on the magni-
tude of the government deficit financed internally. Much of the impact has been
on the revenue side. Important foreign-sector-related direct revenue sources
have included import taxes, export taxes, direct taxes on large-scale mining,
participation in profits of large-scale mining, and net revenues from exchange-
rate differentials.19 There has been a secular reduction in the relative direct de-
pendence of the government on the foreign sector for tax revenues. Taxes
related to foreign trade averaged 83 per cent of total taxes in 1908—27, 34 per
cent in 1940—55,andabout 21 per cent in 1956—70 (line 1.2.6.6 in Table
A.!).2° This decline partially originated in the conscious development of al-
ternative domestic sources of revenue in order to reduce dependence on the
foreign sector. It also has reflected the indirect and not clearly intended impact
of some of the policies discussed in Part II above. These policies have discour-
aged exports and created the need to restrain imports, both of which have
lowered trade-related tax revenues.
The impact of devaluation on the real value of tax revenues depends on
the magnitude of increased revenues from expanded production and exports
in comparison to probable reduced revenues from imports 21 and from reactions
to increased anticipated inflation (relations C.5', C.6', C.9', C.14', and C.15'
in Appendix C).22 The net effect probably is to increase government reve-
nues. The impact of increased quantitative restrictions on real tax revenues
depends on the magnitude of increased taxes from domestic production rela-
tive to that of reduced taxes from imports (relations CS', C.9', and C. 14') 23
A one-sector model obscures, however, one interesting additional result of
quantitative restrictions. The intensification of these restrictions often has fa-
vored mass-consumption items over other categories for income-distribution
purposes and as part of the attempt to moderate inflationary expectations (see
above). For the same reasons, these items generally have had relatively low im-
port tax rates. Therefore, the intensification of quantitative restrictions at times
reduced government tax revenues by lowering the average import tax rate be-
cause it not merely reduced total imports but changed their composition as
well.24 The net effect of all of these factors probably has been to reduce
government revenues when restrictions increased.
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ment expenditure included the direct financial costs to the government of op-
a erating the regime and subsidies associated with the regime. No attempt is made
in this study to present econometric estimates for the first of these costs, but
evidence for other countries indicates that they may have been rather sub-
stantial.25 Explicit subsidies associated with the international economic regime
kin during the 1945—64 period were very limited, although subsequently they were
increased as part of the expanded export-promotion programs under Frei and
tor Allende (see subsection 4.2.2). Substantial implicit subsidies were made by
use of favorable exchange rates and special regimes for various commodities
(see Chapter 3 and sections 4.1 and 6.1). Furthermore, the foreign sector ap-
•ces parently affected government expenditure by substitution between net foreign
savings and government savings (see subsection 12.2.3.2). Unless the last
•'ge- effect was quite strong, however, the net impact of devaluation and liberaliza-
tion probably has been to reduce government expenditures.
kes Beyond the question of how foreign-sector policy has affected government
per revenues and expenditures is the question of determining what proportion of
the government deficit has been financed externally. To the extent that such
al- deficits have been financed externally and that the increased foreign exchange
has been used to raise the flow of imports, the monetary base has not been in-
Bct creased.
ur- As is noted in the previous chapter, sources for external financing of the
ive government deficit dried up completely with the Great Depression. In the
1940s and early 1950s they increased somewhat, but still were not of major
on importance. As part of the stabilization and liberalization efforts of 1956—58
Its and 1959—61, however, government deficits were financed mainly abroad. The
aim was to reduce inflationary pressures.2° In addition to some short-run attain-
•(5' ment of this goal, one result was a considerable addition to Chile's foreign debt.
iii. The foreign sector has not only affected the monetary base, but also
ies has altered the money multiplier. Behrman [1974] gives estimates of behavioral
Ia- relations which determine the money multiplier. These estimates together with
the results presented in Appendix C suggest that devaluation has increased the
of money multiplier by reducing the currency-to-money ratio (owing to higher
ía- interest rates and higher income), the reserve-to-deposit ratio (owing to higher
interest rates and higher anticipated inflation), and the ratio of time deposits to
money (owing to higher anticipated inflation). They imply some counteracting
tendencies of devaluation to reduce the money multiplier by increasing the ratio
of time deposits to money (owing to higher interest rates and a higher PLD-
NER, which affects expectations) and the currency-to-deposit ratio (owing to
the higher PLD-NER) •2TThenet effect on the monetary multiplier probably
has been expansionary.
• iv.Several additional relations between foreign-sector policy and the
• money supply merit mention in passing. Increases in prior-deposit requirements
A
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on imports have had the deflationary effect of absorbing part of the money
supply (especially after such deposits were switched from the banking system 9
tothe Treasury in the 1960s). Devaluation also has had an additional defla-
tionary effect not mentioned above, since at least a portion of the premiums
previously received by importers has been transferred to the government.
Given that imports generally have exceeded exports, devaluation has had a
further deflationary effect, since more domestic currency has been required
after a devaluation to finance the same dollar value of deficit as before.
General-Equilibrium Implications.The model in Chapter 2 provides a
f
framework for evaluating the empirical magnitude of general-equilibrium price
responses to changes in NERs and quantitative restrictions. This model roughly
parallels the one in Appendix C on a multisector level, with the incorporation
of inflationary anticipations, wages, and the money supply as endogenous
variables.
For simulation 2.1.1 in Table A.1l, equal proportional changes are as-
sumed in all NERs, ceteris paribus, in the first year only (1962). The first-year
price elasticity is 0.6, and the third-year elasticity is 0.3.28 This quite positive
price response partially reflects a response in the money supply due to increased
international reserves, reduced net free reserves, and the changed composition
of money demand. Also of importance are the direct price and price expecta-
tional links and a positive relation to the ratio of net demand to net supply as
the foreign trade flows change (see subsection 9.1.3.1).
The widespread reluctance of Chileans to devalue because of an antici-
pated negative short-run inflationary impact, then, is well-founded. Such price
increases, moreover, undo much of the potential positive effects of devaluation
on the balance of payments (see subsections 6.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.1). Unless much
more powerful monetary tools are developed, however, Chile cannot avoid the
intensification of inflationary pressures from devaluation.
For simulation 2.3 in Table A. 11, equal proportional changes are as-
sumed in all quantitative restrictions, ceteris paribus, in the first year only. The
general-equilibrium elasticities of price are quite high, 1.6 in the first year and
1.5 in the third. These sizable responses primarily reflect the impact of quanti-
tative restrictions on the money supply through changes in international re-
serves. Such results lead to more optimism about the short-run impact of
liberalization than does consideration of simulation 2.1.1 in isolation. If lib-
eralization accompanies devaluation, the price effects of the former will at best
partially offset the inflationary consequences of the latter. This counteracting
tendency has been too often ignored in discussions of the short-run conse-
quences of devaluation and liberalization in the Chilean economy.SHORT-RUN STABILITY IN NOMINAL AND REAL TERMS 231
9.2REAL FLUCTUATIONS
Variations in real output are a second short-run concern. A frequently en-
countered criticism of Chilean liberalization efforts is that they have caused
losses in real output and employment. In this section, three questions regarding
this charge are taken up: (i) Have there been phase-associated fluctuations in
capacity utilization? 29(ii)Have capacity-utilization rates been sensitive to
a foreign-sector changes on a partial-equilibrium basis? (iii) What has been the
general-equilibrium response of capacity utilization to changes in the interna-
IY tional economic regime, ceteris paribus?
•In
9.2.1Associations of Capacity-Utilization Rates with Exchange
•s- Control Phases.
•
A simple association between the mean capacity-utilization rates for
phases and subphases and the degree of liberalization is not evident (line 2.2 in
Table A. 1)Thehighest means are for the Phase II periods of 1962—64 and
197 Next is that for the Phase III years of 1965_70,32 followed by that
for the type-Il subphase of the Second World The lowest average by far
was for 1931—39 and was due to the impact of the Great Depression (see sec-
don 1.3). Next lowest were those for the Phase II years of 1947—5 1 and Phase
III years of The mean rose from that of the previous period for the
1959—61Phase IV liberalization, but fell for the two Phase HI liberalizations.
That lack of a simple association is not surprising: capacity utilization is
largely determined by domestic factors rather than foreign ones (see subsec-
tion 9.2.2). Much of the importance of the foreign sector in the determination
of capacity utilization, moreover, has been due to wars and export-market
ie fluctuations. These phenomena are beyond Chilean control. They clearly are
d not caused by any changes Chile might make in her international economic
policy regimes.
On the other hand, Chilean policy probably somewhat exacerbated short-
run instability in real terms. Overvaluation effectively discouraged greater
diversification in exports, which would have reduced vulnerability to inter-
national fluctuations (see Chapter 7) and led to restrictions on imported inputs
g at times of balance-of-payments crisis.
9.2.2Partial-Equilibrium Determinants of Capacity Utilization.
Table 9.2 contains regression estimates of the determinants of capacity
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Notes to Table 9.2
R2 =coefficientof multiple determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
SE =standarderror of estimate.
DW Durbin-Watson statistic.
a. Each independent variable is multiplied by the sectoral capacity of real GDP.
Except as indicated in the notes, the variables are not lagged. The figures in parentheses
below the point estimates are the .absolute values of the t statistics. All point estimates
are significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level unless otherwise noted. The figures in
brackets are the elasticities at the point of sample means. Behrman [1974] gives data
sources and further details.
b. Public credit only for mining; private credit only for housing; public plus private
credit for services.
c. .Ratio of imports of staple consumer goods to agricultural capacity for agriculture;
ratio of intermediate imports to total GDP for mining; and ratio of lagged total imports
to lagged total GDP for housing.
d. Sum of value of real government direct and indirect investment, depreciated at
rate of 3 per cent through past year, as ratio to total real GDP.
e. Ratio of product price, adjusted for direct and indirect taxes, to unit labor costs
including employers' social security contributions.
f. Ratio of noninventory investment to GDP.
g. Significantly nonzero at the 10 per cent level.
h. Significantly nonzero at the 15 per cent level.
i. Ratio of domestic GDP deflator to United States GDP deflator adjusted for the
average import tax rate and the average prior.deposit rate.
j. Ratio of product price, adjusted for direct and indirect taxes, to material input
price index.
k. Ratio of total inventory level to GDP.
I. Average indirect tax rate.
m. Rate of change of GDP deflator.
n. Lagged dependent variable (no: multiplied by sectoral capacity). For this sector
the Durbin-Watson statistic is biased toward 2.0.
o. Ratio of product price, adjusted for direct and indirect taxes, to wages adjusted
for employers' social security contribution.
sectoral GDPadjusts toward a level determined by the desired capacity-utili-
zation rate and actual real sectoral capacity.36
On an over-all level these estimates appear to be quite satisfactory. The
corrected coefficients of determination imply that the results are consistent with
from 94 to 98 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable over the
sample period. Evidence of considerable problems of autocorrelation does not P
appear. The signs of the significantly nonzero coefficient estimates generally
are those anticipated a priori.
Variations in sectoral real capacities underlie much of the fluctuation in
real product, but the variations in the desired sectoral capacity-utilization rates
also are quite important. Among the domestic determinants of the desired
utilization rates, significantly nonzero coefficients are obtained in at least three
sectors for price ratios of product to labor input, indices of the change in
current economic activity, and relative availability of credit. In addition, there
are several significant sector-specific coefficients. A proxy for public infrastruc-234 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
ture developmeht affects agriculture. The level of over-all investment influences
utilization in construction. The 1960 earthquake reduced utilization in con- e
struction and increased it in housing. Indirect taxes discouraged production
particularly in transportation and housing. Anticipated inflation has induced
higher production in utilities.
Space limitations preclude discussion of these factors here. Some of them,
however, have important roles in the indirect transmission of the impact of
foreign-policy changes which are included in the general-equilibrium analysis
of the next subsection.37
For every sector there is evidence of some direct significantly nonzero im-
pact of the international economic regime on the level of desired capacity utili-
zation. The ratio of competing imports to domestic product is inversely related
to real product in agriculture and housing. For the former sector the frequent
policies of increasing food imports as part of the anti-inflationary strategy (e.g.,
through Public Law 480), therefore, may have had a direct negative feedback
on subsequent domestic production. The ratio of intermediate imports to
product has a significant impact in mining, but not in other sectors. At least for
industry the lack of significance of intermediate imports may be somewhat
surprising given the hypothesized increasing dependence of that sector on im-
ported inputs.38 Indices of quantitative restrictions (including the ratio of the
black-market to the national accounts NERs) have significantly nonzero co-
efficients for every sector except agriculture. For mining and for transporta-
tion these coefficients are negative, which suggests that the restraining effect
on production due to limitations on imported inputs together with the associ-
ation between the use of quantitative restrictions and an overvalued exchange
rate which penalizes mining exports are dominant. For other sectors, however,
apparently any restraining effects of quantitative restrictions due to imported
input shortages are more than offset by increased demand due to shortages of
competing imports. For services, furthermore, the significantly positive coeffi-
cient of the quantitative restrictions index presumably also reflects the direct
use of increased numbers of people to administer the OR regulations.
The direct effects of foreign-sector policies on capacity utilization, thus,
have been widespread. They have sometimes, however, been partially offset-
ting. Indirect effects, moreover, may have been reinforcing or offsetting. To
discern the net impact of changes in the international economic regime on ca-
pacity utilization, therefore, a general-equilibrium framework must be used.
9.2.3Impact of Foreign-Sector Policies on Capacity Utilization Within
a General-Equilibrium Framework.
The model of national income determination in Appendix C gives an in-
sight into the impact on production of changes in NERs and quantitative re-
- -- - .... ..,
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es strictions. If price anticipations, nominal wages, and the money supply are
exogenous, relationship C.14' gives the comparative static effects of such
changes on production. Both devaluation and intensified quantitative restric-
tions probably increase aggregate demand and therefore production. The
effects of changed marginal propensities and productivities on the size of these
increases generally are the same as is discussed in subsection 9.1.3.2, above.
However, the impact is greater the higher the marginal product of labor and
sis the lower the second derivative of production with respect to labor, instead of
vice versa.
The arguments presented in subsection 9.1.3.2 for the endogenism of price
1i anticipations, nominal wages, and the money supply again hold for devaluation
ed and also, in the case of the money supply, for changes in quantitative restric-
• tions. Induced increases in anticipated inflation and in the money supply both
probably increase aggregate demand and production. Therefore, they reinforce
the effects noted in the previous paragraph. Induced rises in the nominal wage,
to however, have the opposite effect because the aggregate supply curve moves
or up owing to higher labor costs (relation C.12') and the aggregate demand
.' curve moves down owing to reductions in the incentive to export because of
higher labor costs (relations C.6' and C.14').
he The model in Chapter 2 again provides a framework for evaluating the
empirical magnitude of general-equilibrium production responses to changes
:a- in NERs and quantitative restrictions. In this model sectoral capacity-utiliza-
tion rates are determined by the estimates in Table 9.2. Therefore, direct effects
of quantitative restrictions on production are incorporated, in contrast to the
ge I moresimplified model of Appendix C.
Simulation 2.1. 1 in Table A. 11 explores the impact of equal percentage
ed changes in all NERs, ceteris paribus, for the first year only of the simulation.
of The first-year response is inverse, although quite small in absolute value. The
fi positive responses in most other sectors almost offset the negative responses in
ct industry, services, and housing. The third-year elasticity is positive, although
still quite small at 0.1
is, Under the assumption that employment rates are highly correlated with
capacity-utilization rates, these results prima facie contradict the Taylor and
Co Black [1973] estimates of an employment elasticity of This discrepancy
a- reflects the consequences of three different sets of assumptions in the two
models: (i) Taylor and Black posit immediate adjustment in the labor market
and no adjustment in the capital stock, while the model used here has lagged
adjustments for both labor and capital; (ii) Taylor and Black maintain the
nominal wage constant when they change the exchange rate, but considerable
wage adjustment occurs in simulation (iii) Taylor and Black exclude
• a number of indirect effects that are passed through the monetary system but
which are incorporated here.
a236 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
Although the labor-adjustment mechanism in the present study may be
somewhat too slow and, therefore, the true value of the first-year employment
elasticity may be positive, a general-equilibrium value approaching that pre-
sented by Taylor and Black seems quite unlikely. More probable is a con-
clusion consistent with the results presented in Table A. 11. The first-year
employment-capacity utilization impact is likely to be very small—and possi-
bly inverse. The medium-run impact is likely to be positive, although still not
very large.42 These results support the conventional Chilean wisdom that de-
valuation has a very limited and possibly negative short-run impact on
production.43
Simulation 2.3 in Table A. 11 investigates the effects of equal propor-
tional changes in all quantitative restrictions, ceteris paribus, in the first year
only. The protective effects of quantitative restrictions on competing final goods
apparently dominate effects on imported input supplies. The elasticity of real
capacity utilization is 0.1 in the first year and 0.2 in the third year.
The total implications of these two simulations are not very encouraging
for liberalization programs. They imply that devaluations together with reduc-
tions in quantitative restrictions almost certainly will cause a drop in capacity
utilization rates. Offsetting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies might be
called for. However, such policies wonld feed the already considerable inflation
unless spiraling inflationary expectations were radically lowered. Such a re-
adjustment of price anticipations may be possible only with substantial short-
run political or economic dislocations or both—a topic far beyond the subject
of this book.
NOTES
1. The related question of how price changes affected the international economic
policy regimes is considered in Chapter 13.
2. In Table A.1 only 1971 is included for the Phase II Allende period. In 1972 the
inflation rate exceeded 160 per cent, and in 1973 it rose to an even higher level.
3. During the Phase III 1965—69 period, however, much of the liberalization oc-
curred after the abandonment of price stabilization attempts.
4. The adjustment processes are represented by the Hall-Sutch [1969] polynomial
method (without a tail) over a six-year period for the rates of change of the money
supply and real GDP and for expectations regarding the rate of change of the NER.
Other adjustments are represented by the possibility of a geometric process for the de-
pendent variable or by simple lags for other variables.
5. Intermediate-input prices include the price of imported components and, thus,
the direct impact of the international economic regime.
6. Alternative estimates are in Behrman [1973c], Corbo [1971:198—2011, Garcia
[1964], Harberger [1963], and Yver [1970].
7. The NER changes also may represent a cost-push factor in that the local-currency
cost of external indebtedness increases as the NER increases.SHORT-RUN STABILITY IN NOMINAL AND REAL TERMS 237
8. The results suggest that the rate of growth of the price of services declines rela-
tively when these imported inputs increase relatively in price.
9. For no sector is there evidence of a significant response to rates of change of
import unit values multiplied by the EER or to sectoral imports relative to domestic
absorption.
10. To the extent that changes in quantitative restrictions only changed the premi-
urns going to traders with import licenses, of course, these changes did not affect sectoral
prices.
11. Behrman [1974] includes estimates for the determination of the rate of change
of deflators of final demand components that suggest similar conclusions. Among that
group devaluation would have the strongest direct impact on exports, imports, and invest-
ment. Quantitative restrictions have a fairly pervasive direct impact, including an inverse
or- relationship for the export deflator, apparently because use of such restrictions makes
possible continuance of an overvalued NER.
12. Sohmen [1958:271—273] demonstrates that prices must decline after devaluation
if economic welfare increases when quantitative restrictions, import taxes, etc., are used.
However,he assumes that money national income is kept constant due to monetary and
fiscal policies and that full employment is maintained. Such assumptions are not appro-
ng priate for recent Chilean history.
13. This estimate is from Behrman [l973b:2561. It is very conservative because it
is based on a trend-through-the-peaks capacity definition which refers to shortfalls from
.' actuallyattained rather than potential production levels.
be 14. A Keynesian model is much more appropriate in the Chilean case than for most
on developing economies because the nonmonetized sector is quite small, saving and invest-
ment decisions often are separated, and there is some evidence of a significant role for
interest rates (see Behrman [1972b]). On the other hand, comparative statics analysis
with a Keynesian model has many of the same limitations in the Chilean case as in the
Ct caseof more developed economies. Probably most important is the focus on equilibrium
solutions rather than disequilibrium adjustments. Despite the burgeoning recent literature
on disequilibrium, however, at this time the state of the art does not permit satisfactory
analysis of disequilibrium behavior except under very particular ad hoc assumptions.
— Theterm "Keynesian model" is notusedhere to mean a case in which all focus is
on aggregate demand, and supply considerations are ignored. To the contrary, an aggre-
ic gate production function is explicitly included (see Appendix C).
15. If the sign of any dependent term cited here or subsequently is ambiguous, but
one sign is much more likely than the other, given the available empirical evidence or
a priori expectations or both, no qualifications are made, both because of limitations of
c- space and because of the complexity of the explanation.
Space limitations also preclude a detailed explanation of why these dependencies are
al of the indicated sign (e.g., the more sensitive the marginal product of capital to the
number of laborers, the greater is the inducement to invest in response to the expanded
I. aggregate demand which occurs because of foreign trade responses to devaluation). Care-
s- ful consideration of Appendix C, however, should generally provide any necessary
I clarification.
16. For changes in quantitative restrictions, the behavior of the money supply has
not been exogenous.
17. In the 1956—58 effort at stabilization plus liberalization, for example, the im-
ported component of the wholesale price index rose quite substantially (about 30 per
cent) relative to the over-all index. The relative unification of NERs resulted in rather
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guayan tea) which previously had been more favored and which had disproportionately
large weights in the price indices. Likewise the changes in the regime caused relatively hi
large increases for export and mining-related price indices owing to the reduction of
discrimination against key products included there.
18. For evidence see Behrman [197 la,1974] and Behrman and Garcia [1973]. cc
19. Not all of these sources are independent. The tax function estimates in Behrman
[1974], for example, imply a direct trade-off between government revenues from NER
discrimination for the legal cost of production of large-scale mining and government
revenues from direct taxes on large-scale mining. For every escudo increase in the legal
cost of production due to the former, revenues from direct taxes decreased by 0.41 to
escudos (after the NuevoTrato).
20. The 18 per cent figure for 1965—70 in Table A.1 is misleading in a sense because ti
government participation replaced some direct taxes in large-scale mining.
21. Imports decline if the price and exchange-rate effects in relation C.5' outweigh
the income effect.
22. For evidence of art inverse relation between taxes and expected inflation in
Chile see Behrman [1974]. This reaction reflects the incentive to postpone tax payments o
when expected inflation is high because the nominal penalties for late payment do not
offset the expected capital gains from postponement until prices have increased. u
23. It is assumed that the quantitative restrictions in fact do reduce imports despite
the increase in import demand due to over-all expanded aggregate demand. tI
24. A regression of the logarithm of nominal import taxes (TXM) on the logarithm
of the nominal value of imports (M), a secular time trend (TIME), an anticipated a
inflation variable to represent tax avoidence (7r), and an index of quantitative restrictions
(QR) provides some weak support for this hypothesis:
TXM = 0.610 M + 0.116 TIME —0.0029ir —2.71QR + 1.63
e
(6.3) (3.7) (2.0)(1.7) (1.0)
e
= 0.997; SE = 0.101; DW = 2.0; years covered, 1945—65
25. See Bhagwati and Srinivasan [1975] and Krueger [l972b] for examples.
1 S
26. The external financing was supposed to be an interim measure while fiscal
reforms were enacted.
27. The institution of dollar deposits in 1959—61 also lowered the money multiplier
by increasing the ratio of time deposits to money. a
28. For a sustained devaluation, such as in simulation 2.1.3, the third-year price
impact is much larger than in this case due to the cumulative effects. For both simulations 1
2.1.1 and 2.1.3 the first-year estimates are quite comparable to the range of 0.48 to 0.69 C
which Harberger [1964] presents for a model based in substantial part on his Chilean t
experience. Harberger assumes a constant nominal money wage rate and complete ad-
justment to a sustained devaluation. The effect of the first of these assumptions should C
be to lower his estimate relative to that of the present model, but the effect of the second
should be to increase it relatively.
29. A trend-through-the-peak capacity definitionis used throughout this section.
This definition measures output against attainable capacity (not rated capacity) and
therefore gives relatively high utilization rates. Behrman [1973b] and others he cites
there discuss the advantages and limitations of this definition.
30. For recent years the Santiago unemployment rate provides supplementary infor-
mation about the utilization of productive resources (line 2.3 in Table Al). The move-
ments in this variable reinforce the characterization of short-run developments based on
the capacity-utilization measure alone.SHORT-RUN STABILITY IN NOMINAL AND REAL TERMS 239
31.Table A.l includes only 1971, but the scanty available evidence suggests that
high capacity utilization continued at least into 1972. For example, for January—April
1972 as compared to the same period for 1971, CORFO [1972a,l/8/72:1—3] reports in-
creases of over 15 per cent for industrial production, industrial use of electrical power,
I cement production, and shipments of iron and steel products. Also the unemployment
rate of the Greater Santiago area on March 1972 was 0.048 as compared to 0.082 a year
earlier. The only negative figure concerning the use of real capacity was a decline of 4.4
it per cent in kilometer-tons of freight transported by the railroads.
32. As liberalization accelerated later in this phase, however, utilization rates tended
.1 to decline.
33. Note that capacity utilization in 1908—27 averaged as high as during the rela-
tively prosperous World War II subphase. This observation raises questions about the
structuralists' characterization of Chilean capacity utilization as being very vulnerable to
fluctuations emanating from the foreign sector in the period of relatively liberal foreign
economic policies before the Great Depression.
34. Critics of the Ibaflez-Klein-Saks stabilization program of 1956—58 have focused
on this decline, although they have tended to overstate its magnitude.
Given capacity, variations in product directly determine variations in capacity-
utilization rates.
te 36. The adjustment process is a geometric distributed lag, but only for utilities do
the results suggest significant adjustment extending beyond one year.
37. For further consideration of these results see Behrman [1974]. For an earlier
attempt to estimate Chilean capacity-utilization determinants see Behrman [1973b].
is 38. Anne Krueger has suggested that this impact may be represented by the quanti-
tative restrictions variable. The effect of such restrictions on intermediate imports was
explored in section 6.2.
39. By the third year, however, changes in capacity occur. Therefore, the production
elasticity no longer is the same as the utilization-rate elasticity.
40. Taylor and Black obtain this estimate when they use the same elasticities of sub-
stitution between capital and labor that are utilized in this study. Under the assumption
*1 of elasticities of substitution between capital and labor of 1.0, they obtain an elasticity
• of employment with respect to the NER of 1.7.
41. Taylor and Black acknowledge that a constant nominal wage is not at all prob-
able under exchange-rate adjustments.
e 42. Within a partial-equilibrium framework de Castro and de Ia Cuadra [1971:12—
13, 20—21] reach the same conclusion for the immediate impact on employment in
9 Chilean industry (although their specification of time periods is not clear). They main-
it tamthat for given industrial capacity, the subsectoral increases in the demand for labor
1- originating in exchange-rate alterations would offset approximately the subsectoral de-
d creases.
d 43. If devaluation induces substantial decumulation of speculative inventories built
up in anticipation of the devaluation, the results may not be more deflationary than is
suggested by the present model.
d